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INTRODUCTION 
The short but intense military history of the state of Israel has pro-
duced a vast amount of material to be studied when considering the pro-
blems of modern military conflict. This material has often been 
characterized by dramatic Israeli military victories which are followed by 
precise and effective policies of military occupation. A more recent 
chapter in Israel's military history is, however, substantially less im-
pressive. It involves Israel's struggle to control the 1983-85 Shi'ite 
Moslem insurgency of southern Lebanon. In this conflict the Israelis fac-
ed military and civil-military relations problems which ultimately proved 
unsolvable for them. 
The purpose of this article is to present an overview of the problems 
of the occupation of southern Lebanon as well as the Israeli response to 
these problems. In this way, many lessons of the conflict should become 
apparent. Throughout this analysis, special emphasis will be given to 
Israeli policies which may have inadvertently helped to alienate the 
Shi'ite population of southern Lebanon from the occupying forces. Since 
the Shi'ites were not openly antagonistic toward Israel at the beginning 
of the occupation, special problems associated with the management of 
the occupation assume a critical importance in discovering how the 
Shi'ite war became one of the most disastrous chapters in Israeli military 
history. It also serves as an example of how an occupying force can 
deceive itself on the psychology and potential motivations of a civilian 
population within their area of control. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHI'ITE OPPOSITION 
Israeli military involvement in Lebanon initially had nothing to do 
with the Shi'ites of that country. Rather, from 1970 until 1982, Israel's 
primary concern in Lebanon was with the activities of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). It was in 1970, after being expelled from 
Jordan, that the PLO moved almost all of its independently controlled 
military assets into Lebanon1. The movement of these combat assets in-
evitably resulted in the escalation of conflict in southern Lebanon. This 
occurred as the PLO mounted almost all of its attacks on Israel from 
southern Lebanese bases. The Israeli response involved intense use of 
bombing attacks and commando raids. 
The situation in Lebanon was of sufficient concern to Israel by 
March 1978 that it mounted a military operation into that country using 
approximately 25,000 troops. This action (initially code-named Opera-
tion Stone of Wisdom) involved intense fighting but only proceeded as 
far north as the Litani River with the city of Tyre excluded from occupa-
tion (although it was heavily bombed). The operation was considered at 
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least partially successful since PLO bases were devastated. The short-
coming of the operation, for Israel, was that most of the PLO fighters 
withdrew to the north in the face of the Israeli advance. This allowed 
them to maintain their combat power and to re-establish bases in the 
south of Lebanon following a rapid Israeli withdrawal.2 
A more elaborate campaign to deal with the PLO was embarked 
upon in June 1982. In this operation (code-named Operation Peace for 
Galilee) Israeli forces consisting of at least 85,000 troops crossed the 
border and moved northward to the outskirts of Beirut. Their primary 
objectives were to destroy the PLO infrastructure in southern Lebanon 
and to install a friendly government in Beirut under Maronite Christian 
leader Bashir Gemayel. The first objective was met when the PLO was 
driven north to Beirut and then evacuated from the city to other Arab 
countries following a US mediation effort. The second objective ap-
peared to have been met when Gemayel was elected President in the wake 
of Israel's invasion. 
The 700,000 Shi'ite Moslems who comprise 80 per cent of the 
population of southern Lebanon perceived the possibility of gaining 
some substantial benefits from the Israeli invasion of their country. By 
1982 the Shi'ites had their own list of grievances against the PLO and 
were very interested in seeing the organization expelled from southern 
Lebanon. Included among these grievances were: (1) the PLO's capacity 
to attract Israeli reprisal raids to southern Lebanon; (2) the arrogant and 
high-handed treatment of Shi'ite villagers by some PLO members; (3) 
religious differences with the predominantly Sunni Moslem Palestinians; 
and (4) considerable Shi'ite suspicion of PLO complicity in the 1979 
disappearance in Libya of their religious leader, Imam Musa Sadr.3 
The Shi'ite Lebanese political and military organization, Amal, was 
correspondingly careful not to interfere in the Israeli/PLO bloodshed. 
Mahmour Ghadar, the military commander of the Amal in the south 
issued orders that none of his troops were to resist the Israeli advance. If 
necessary, Ghadar instructed, Amal members should even turn their 
weapons over to the Israelis rather than allow fighting to develop bet-
ween the two sides. These orders were largely obeyed. All of the 200 
Amal militias associated with the villages in southern Lebanon stayed out 
of the fighting. Only a small number of Amal members joined with the 
PLO during the fighting in the Burj Shemali refugee camp near Tyre." 
The Amal leadership also refused to sanction Shi'ite participation in the 
battle of Beirut. When Israeli forces reached the Shi'ite "poverty belt" 
outside of the city, Amal head, Nabih Berri, allowed the Israelis to enter 
the area unopposed. He then made arrangements with them to keep his 
troops out of the fighting.5 Those Amal troops that did fight beside the 
PLO did so without the sanction or operational support of their leader-
ship. 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1982 invasion relations between 
the Shi'ites and the Israelis were not characterized by excessive tension or 
hostility. Israeli troops patronized Shi'ite stores and markets while some 
prominent Shi'ites visited Jerusalem. Religious fundamentalism was not 
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widespread in the south at this time. The Shi'ites believed that the Israeli 
presence was temporary and behaved with a corresponding caution, 
though this caution indicated neither acquiescence nor approval. It was 
only restraint in the face of a well-armed occupier who had promised to 
leave the country within one year. The Shi'ites had no intention of being 
drawn into a more sweeping relationship with Israel and were keenly 
aware that such a relationship would not be forgiven by many 
non-Shi'ite Lebanese. 
The initial Shi'ite restraint was not to last. The September 14, 1982 
assassination of Bashir Gemayel left the Israelis without the strong leader 
who they hoped would impose order on the south. A troop withdrawal 
was therefore increasingly seen as unwise by the Israelis. They also hoped 
to predicate their own withdrawal on similar actions being taken by 
Syrian troops in the Biqa Valley. This delayed any plans to withdraw 
from Lebanon although in September 1983 the Israelis did redeploy to a 
defensive line south of the Awali River, with approximately 33,000 
Israeli troops remaining in Lebanon. 
The Israeli decision to stay in southern Lebanon for an undetermin-
ed period was not well-received by the Shi'ites. A variety of early Zionist 
literature had suggested that the lands and waters of southern Lebanon 
were appropriate for incorporation into the Jewish homeland. While in 
Israel such literature had largely been relegated to an ideological past, the 
Shi'ites now began to reconsider the significance of these works.6 Fur-
thermore, the Israeli links to the Christians of Lebanon (including the 
Phalangists and the "Lebanese Forces") suggested that Israel would be 
willing to support a system of continuing Christian hegemony over the 
Shi'ite Moslems. Closer to home the Shi'ites also worried about the 
Israeli-created Christian militias which functioned on Israel's northern 
border. Led initially by Greek Catholic Major Saad Haddad, these 
militias were never seen as particularly friendly to the Shi'ites. Various 
attempts by the militias to introduce a limited number of Shi'ite Moslems 
into the junior ranks were made to partially overcome this problem but 
these met with only limited success. Potential recruits usually remained 
aloof out of a fear that the Israeli-sponsored troops would ultimately 
come into armed conflict with Amal.7 
In this atmosphere of distrust, the Israelis committed an especially 
significant blunder. On October 16, 1983 an Israeli military convoy made 
its way through the Shi'ite town of Nabatiye during a ceremony honoring 
the Shi'ite martyr Hussein ibn Ali. The ceremony was a wild one involv-
ing self-flagellation and large scale processions in the street. While trying 
to pass through this procession the Israelis provoked a riot which 
resulted in the deaths of two Shi'ites and the wounding of several others. 
This event led to the issuance of a binding religious dictum {fatwa) by 
Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, the leading Shi'ite cleric in 
southern Lebanon. The dictum stated that the Shi'ites were to engage in 
"civil disobedience" and "resistance to the occupation in the South." 
While no explicit call to violence was included in this statement, the 
Shi'ite campaign of armed resistance was about to begin in earnest.' As it 
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unfolded the Israelis faced a new military situation requiring a response 
from them. 
THE NATURE OF ISRAELI SECURITY POLICIES 
IN LEBANON 
The Shi'ite decision to resist the Israeli occupation by force 
ultimately led to thousands of Israeli dead and wounded and to the deci-
sion by Israel to withdraw its forces unilaterally from Lebanon without 
gaining concessions from either Syria or the Lebanese government. The 
force that inflicted these casualties from September 1983 onward was 
drawn predominantly from Lebanon's Shi'ite community. This com-
munity represents Lebanon's largest sect, consisting of approximately 
850,000 individuals of whom about 700,000 live in the southern part of 
the country. Actual fighting has been conducted by an umbrella 
organization known as the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF), 
a front believed to include Amal, Islamic Amal, the Islamic Resistance 
Movement (which is linked to the fundamentalist Hezbollah party), and 
possibly the Islamic Jihad group and Lebanese Communist party.' 
In order to understand the dynamics of the escalation in the 
fighting, one must first understand the nature of the Israeli occupation 
and how it evolved in the face of increasing military operations against 
the Israeli army. Overall policy was set by the Israeli cabinet, which 
usually deferred most judgments to the Defense Ministry. The Defense 
Ministry, in turn, issued detailed guidelines for the administration of the 
occupation. These guidelines were passed to Northern Command head-
quarters for distribution to the Israeli brigades and their subordinate 
units throughout the Lebanese area of operation.10 In most cases, com-
mand, control and communications worked well with the up-
ward/downward flow of information and orders functioning smoothly. 
As fighting intensified, it was also not uncommon for the Defense 
Minister to fly to the site of a successful Shi'ite ambush and get on-the-
spot feedback on how guidelines might be improved." 
In making decisions about what type of policy guidelines to apply, the 
Israelis relied upon a large body of doctrine on military occupation and 
controlling resistance movements. The doctrine was based primarily on the 
experience of occupation in the aftermath of the June 1967 War. This doc-
trine stressed reducing the resources of hostile forces through military ac-
tion, pre-empting enemy attacks through intelligence work and reducing 
the damage that hostile forces could inflict through physical security 
measures.12 While these practices seemed sound, the doctrine also 
minimized the dangers of occupation duties and suggested that they could 
be entrusted to administrative and rear area troops performing other func-
tions. Early adherence to this principle caused increased casualties in the 
early stages of the insurgency, although the Israelis corrected this deficien-
cy wherever possible by placing more experienced troops in areas of special 
danger.13 Consistent with all doctrinal principles was the basic Israeli 
strategy of maximizing the physical security of its own troops and attemp-
ting to regulate any Shi'ite behavior that could impact adversely on Israeli 
ability to accomplish this objective. 
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The protection of one's troops in the field is a logical and understan-
dable policy for any army. Measures to insure the protection of Israeli 
troops were to include: (1) the identification and possible arrest of hostile 
individuals and groups within the Shi'ite community; (2) the seizure of 
weapons, explosives and ammunition that might be used against the 
Israel Defense Force (IDF); (3) the development and nurturing of sur-
rogate forces which could perform some of the duties and absorb some 
of the casualties that would otherwise accrue to the IDF; (4) the regula-
tion of the movement of the population through such things as check-
points, curfews, bans on night travel, etc.; and (5) the penetration of the 
Lebanese economy with Israeli imports in order to exert more effective 
control over occupied areas (and possibly to shore-up domestic support 
for the war). Each of these policies will be examined in order to discern 
its effectiveness within the context of the overall campaign to pacify 
southern Lebanon. 
The first policy to be considered involves the Israeli attempt to iden-
tify their enemies in Lebanon. In order to identify individuals and groups 
operating against the Israeli occupation, the IDF instituted policies of ar-
resting, interrogating and detaining large numbers of Shi'ites who could 
be involved in anti-Israeli activity. This began on a moderate scale but 
was expanded when fighting between the two sides intensified. Shi'ites 
living near areas where anti-Israeli ambushes occurred were particularly 
suspect. The arrest of these people was often conducted on a very large 
scale and involved placing them at the Ansar prison camp or other places 
of detention for varying periods of time.14 Such actions frightened and 
humiliated both the individuals arrested and their families. Those left 
behind lived in uncertainty as to the fate of their relatives and friends. 
This policy therefore made enemies. 
The seizure of Shi'ite weaponry, explosives and ammunition was 
another important policy of the Israeli occupation troops which was 
utilized more frequently as the conflict intensified. This was designed to 
disarm a population which had shown an ability and a willingness to at-
tack Israeli troops. The weapons themselves were often especially well-
hidden in secret caches. The existence of these caches was a direct result 
of the 1975-76 breakdown in civil order as well as an earlier desire for 
protection against the PLO guerrillas who operated from southern 
Lebanon. To find these caches, the Israeli made surprise sweeps of 
Shi'ite villages where weapons were believed to be hidden. 
The Israeli sweeps to discover hidden Shi'ite weaponry were usually 
conducted in the early hours of the morning, involving detailed searches 
of Shi'ite households. Those opposing such searches were restrained at 
gunpoint. This is a policy which makes enemies. To complicate matters 
further, some of the Shi'ites hid weapons in mosques and other places of 
religious significance," giving the Israelis the unpleasant choice of either 
leaving the sites (and potentially the weapons) untouched or desecrating 
a Shi'ite religious site by combing it for weapons. The decision to hide 
weapons at these sites may be seen as a situation in which hostile Shi'ites 
attempted (with some success) to provoke the Israelis into a policy which 
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helped to alienate the balance of Shi'ite co-religionists from the occupa-
tion forces. 
The Israeli searches noted above had mixed results. While they were 
sometimes successful in discovering large amounts of such hidden 
weaponry, the resistance nevertheless remained well-armed with weapons 
successfully hidden from the Israelis, bought on the international arms 
market, or smuggled from sources originating in Syria and Iran. The 
Syrian involvement in supplying weapons and explosives is openly 
acknowledged. In one case Syrian television even played a pre-prepared 
interview with a woman (in this case a non-Shi'ite) who had killed two 
Israeli soldiers in a suicide car bomb attack. In the interview she said that 
she was "happy to give her life for [Syrian President] Hafez Assad."16 
The Iranians, for their part, chose to work with the more religious 
elements who would also become known for their suicide attacks against 
Israeli targets." The activities of both states were responsible for a conti-
nuing flow of arms and explosives into Lebanon to which the Israelis 
responded with the self-defeating searches. 
A third Israeli policy for managing the occupation involved the use 
of surrogate forces. These forces consisted of the Southern Lebanese Ar-
my (SLA) and some smaller pro-Israeli civil guard groups associated with 
the SLA. The SLA was a reorganized version of Major Saad Haddad's 
Free Lebanon force. It never included more than 2,100 troops although 
the Israelis had hoped that they might eventually expand the force to in-
clude more than 3,500 troops.18 
The SLA is composed of troops which have been armed, equipped, 
and paid by the Israelis. As such, it is seen by the population as an instru-
ment of Israeli policy and it is the Israelis who are blamed by the Shi'ites 
for the indiscretions and abuse of power by this force. This is a signifi-
cant problem since many of the SLA troops lack discipline or any 
semblance of military professionalism. 
Of all of the abuses of authority that the SLA committed, the most 
notorious occurred in September 1984. In response to a Shi'ite ambush, 
soldiers of the SLA raided the village of Sukmour. About 200 male 
villagers were rounded up "for questioning" and placed in the village 
square. At this point troops of SLA fired into the crowds killing 13 and 
wounding 30. The SLA command quickly disowned this action as the 
revenge of renegade Druze troops, some of whose family members had 
been killed in the previous night's ambush. The IDF also flew the wound-
ed to hospitals in Israel and pledged a full inquiry in which the guilty 
would be brought to trial." 
The massacre remained a significant setback for Israel since few 
Shi'ites chose to view the action as an isolated act of revenge. According 
to the generally accepted Shi'ite view, Israel was at best not exercising 
adequate control over its mercenaries; at worst, it was using them for in-
timidation tasks too sensitive for the IDF to become directly involved. 
Some Shi'ite villagers from Sukmour even chose to embellish the story of 
the massacre by claiming that Israeli troops participated in the event.20 
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The problem was made worse by the fact that SLA troops on their way to 
Sukmour had been wearing red headbands (a sign of revenge) while they 
passed through SLA checkpoints without incident. This led to a belief 
throughout the Shi'ite community that their intentions regarding 
Sukmour were not being disguised and must have been known to Israel 
and the authorities of the SLA. 
The incident at Sukmour helped to make Israel's support of the SLA 
one of the most unpopular policies associated with the occupation. At 
this juncture Israel was also handicapped by the fact that it could not 
withdraw support from the SLA without betraying individuals who had 
pledged to work with Israel. The Israelis, therefore, had become victims 
of their own willingness to entrust sensitive tasks to individuals whose 
shortcomings had been consistently overlooked due to their pro-Israel 
orientation.21 
In addition to having a significant impact on the political life of 
southern Lebanon, the Israeli occupation also had a decisive influence on 
the economy. In this regard, one particularly important policy was the 
IDF's regulation of the movements of people and goods. This was done 
by using a variety of special procedures designed to prevent such things 
as arms smuggling, the emplacement of ambushes, and the use of car 
bombs. These measures included check-points, curfews, bans on night 
travel, bans on the use of motorcycles, bans on only one person traveling 
in a car, and lengthy searches. All of these measures made good sense 
from a security standpoint but they also served to encourage the develop-
ment of further difficulties between the Israelis and the Shi'ite popula-
tion. 
By regulating the movement of people and goods the Israelis may 
have been able to slow the flow of weapons to the south and restrict the 
ability of the guerrillas to strike at them. These measures, however, had 
important side effects for the economy of southern Lebanon. In par-
ticular check-points at the Awali river and bans on the movements of 
some products northward resulted in a crippling of commerce between 
north and south Lebanon without discovering significant numbers of 
arms." Unreliable delivery of materials due to the security regulations 
also hurt a variety of southern Lebanese enterprises. 
The disruption of the economy by Israeli security measures was fur-
ther complicated by a flow of Israeli goods northward and a correspon-
ding inability of Shi'ites to sell their produce (such as citrus and tobacco) 
anywhere else than Israel. This simplified security problems but it also 
inflicted severe hardships on Shi'ite economic enterprises which had to 
cope with both Israeli competition and the security restrictions. A 
number of Lebanese businesses failed because of an inability to cope 
with the problems noted above." This correspondingly added to an 
unemployment rate which was already high due to the previous destruc-
tion of factories and other economic enterprises. Futhermore, the influx 
of Israeli products helped to contribute to a rising cost of living and an 
increasing rate of inflation. The implications of this situation were very 
serious since any Shi'ite political motivations to fight the Israelis were 
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now strongly reinforced by a desire to be rid of them for economic 
reasons. 
One other aspect of Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon also 
deserves comment. This is the use of the so-called "Iron fist" policy. 
This policy was announced by Israeli Defense Minister Rabin in early 
1985 as a response to increasing effectiveness of Shi'ite guerrillas. It is 
(perhaps intentionally) not a well-defined concept but rather a murky 
promise by Rabin to take extremely harsh action against Shi'ites for at-
tacks on the IDF. 
The "Iron fist" therefore represents a general policy of retaliation 
and as such has included many measures such as those already noted 
(curfews, etc.). The difference is that when these policies have been used 
in the name of the "Iron fist" the punishment as well as the security 
aspects were a primary consideration. The action which is usually con-
sidered the prime example of this policy is a March 1985 Israeli attack on 
the village of Zrariyah which occurred in the aftermath of a successful 
car bombing. This attack resulted in the deaths of 34 Shi'ite fighters who 
attempted to resist the incursion. While Israeli Chief of Staff Levy 
denied the raid was a reprisal, other high-ranking Israeli sources suggest 
that the raid would never have occurred had it not been for the car bomb-
ing.24 Israeli troops participating in the raid painted "The Revenge of the 
IDF" on a large wall within the village and blew up a number of houses. 
The above policies, however necessary they may have seemed or 
have been, united the population of Shi'ite Lebanon squarely behind the 
resistance. Active encouragement of policies of resistance came from all 
traditional sources of guidance for the Shi'ite community and increased 
over time. 
THE EXPANSION OF THE SHI'ITE RESISTANCE 
The decision by Israel to allow a significant alienation of its troops 
from the population under occupation was made in the interest of the 
physical security of these same troops. As such the decision was seen to 
have merit and was not a radical departure from previous Israeli policies. 
On the West Bank, for instance, a hostile (although largely unarmed) 
population has been effectively controlled despite its resentment of the 
Israeli presence in the area. In Lebanon, however, there were special pro-
blems with the Shi'ite psychology, weaponry, and circumstance that 
made it possible for the LNRF to expand resistance as relations with the 
Israeli occupation forces deteriorated. These factors are explored below. 
On the psychological level there can be no doubt that members of 
the Shi'ite resistance opposed the Israeli presence with a level of intensity 
directly correlated with the degree to which they perceived themselves as 
wronged by Israel. The reasons for this are related to an array of political 
events occurring both in Lebanon and the larger Islamic and Shi'ite 
worlds. In particular a variety of factors combined to convince Shi'ites 
that they could play a major role in determining their own future provid-
ed that they were willing to fight for their demands. These events 
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involved: (1) the formation of Amal as a pressure group for Shi'ite 
rights; (2) the related outrage over the disappearance of the Amal's first 
leader, the charismatic and unifying Imam Musa Sadr; and (3) the exam-
ple of Shi'ite assertiveness inherent in the Iranian revolution.25 
While the above events had nothing to do with the Israeli occupation 
itself they did involve a Shi'ite assertiveness that was a source of pride 
within large segments of the Shi'ite community. This pride helped to 
prod the Shi'ites out of a traditional fatalism which often caused them to 
accept passively whatever they deemed their fate to be. In making this 
psychological transition some Shi'ites, therefore, developed a bias for ac-
tion that rapidly spread throughout their community. This bias was rein-
forced by a Shi'ite knowledge that southern Lebanon was now free of the 
PLO and that control of their own destiny was finally within Shi'ite 
grasp. With this mindset the Shi'ites were totally unwilling to accept any 
Israeli equivocation about withdrawal. Additionally, any Israeli asser-
tiveness at this point only increased Shi'ite resolve to resist the occupa-
tion and fed the process of escalation. 
Escalation of the fighting in Lebanon occurred not only because the 
Shi'ites were well-motivated but also because they are relatively well-
armed and accustomed to assuring their own security. This presented an 
unusual situation for the Israelis since all other Arab civil populations 
who previously had come under their control did not have large numbers 
of firearms, due mainly to the policies of the Arab governments who 
formerly had controlled these areas. Jordan, in particular, was careful to 
ensure that firearms did not fall into the hands of the West Bank Palesti-
nians that were under its jurisdiction prior to 1967." Lebanon, without a 
functioning authoritative government since 1975, obviously did not have 
this option and the Shi'ites, correspondingly, armed themselves without 
government interference. Shi'ite weapons included small arms, machine 
guns, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), land mines and ex-
plosives. The LNRF made use of these weapons in skirmishes and am-
bushes directed against Israeli forces. In doing so they had the advantage 
of total familiarity with the terrain and population of their country as 
well as the previously noted flow of replacement weapons from Syria. 
This resulted in a Shi'ite ability to inflict casualties on the Israeli occupa-
tion force and expanded resistance to Israel by use of the now infamous 
car bombs. 
In considering the differences between the occupation of Lebanon 
and that of the West Bank, the weaponry factor is probably the most im-
portant reason making one occupation significantly more manageable 
than the other. Additional factors pointed out by Palestinian writer 
Daoud Kuttab included: (1) the prior existence of militias among 
Lebanese Shi'ites; and (2) the availability of well-paying jobs for West 
Bank Palestinians in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war due to an 
Israeli labor shortage. Kuttab suggests that West Bankers were less 
organizationally able to mount an effective resistance campaign and less 
motivated due to a different economic situation.27 
The situation in Lebanon was, therefore, one with which the 
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Israelis had increasing difficulties in coping. In their prior experience 
fighting Arab adversaries, the Israelis had probably never encountered 
such determination. They certainly had never encountered suicide car 
bombs. Futhermore, while over any long period Shi'ite casualties always 
exceeded Israeli casualties, those Israeli casualties had the most corrosive 
effect on its society and army. Unlike the Israelis, the LNRF was not 
plagued by the doubts which characterized the attitude of many Israelis 
over their country's sacrifices in Lebanon. 
As the fighting intensified the Lebanese resistance also became more 
adept at exploiting the weaknesses of the Israeli military. In particular 
the vulnerability of thinly armored or unarmored vehicles to ambush re-
mained a problem. The American-built M-l 13 armored personnel carrier 
(APC) was an especially significant disappointment. This system 
displayed acute vulnerability to Shi'ite ambushes. Previously in the 1982 
war Israeli troops regarded the system as so unsafe that they often chose 
to walk beside the vehicle rather than ride inside.28 Likewise, open-sided 
trucks which the Israelis used to enable their troops to fire on the move 
proved especially vulnerable to ambush." Casualties therefore continued 
to mount with Israeli military solutions serving as an inadequate way of 
dealing with a fierce increase in the intensity of the fighting. 
The level of conflict present in southern Lebanon by early 1985 left 
little doubt that the Israelis had become bogged down in an unproductive 
guerrilla war. The political decision to leave Lebanon became more im-
portant as the fighting continued with no Israeli gains and a significant 
drain on Israeli resources as well as a partial demoralization of the army. 
The way for this decision was cleared by the voluntary withdrawal of 
Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin from Israeli politics and his 
eventual replacement in 1984 by a government of national unity. This 
government involved power sharing between both the Labour and Likud 
political blocs. In January 1985 its leaders decided by a 16 to 6 vote of the 
cabinet in favor of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal of a remaining 22,000 
troops. Only a limited force was to be left in Lebanon to coordinate with 
the SLA. In summarizing the government's reasons for leaving Lebanon, 
Defense Minister Rabin cited Shi' ite assertiveness and maintained that 
the eventual level of Shi'ite resistance came as a total surprise to both the 
Israeli government and intelligence community.30 
CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF ISRAELI COUNTER-
INSURGENCY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The unique feature of the Israeli/Shi'ite war is that it provided a 
striking example of escalating conflict between two antagonists who had 
not initially viewed each other as committed enemies. The security 
policies of the Israelis fed the fears of the Shi'ites whose resistance to the 
Israelis then provoked more stringent security measures and repression. 
This vicious circle of resistance and reaction destroyed any chance of the 
two sides establishing a modus vivendi. It also provides a warning to 
other states that may become involved in especially sensitive occupations 
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One of the more noteworthy aspects in the whole cycle of violence 
emerged from an environment of suppressed hostility. Once that en-
vironment had been set up only a handful of individuals were required to 
precipitate incidents resulting in tremendous escalations in the levels of 
tension and conflict. This occurred with both the riot at Nabatiye in Oc-
tober 1983 and the SLA massacre at Sukmour in September 1984. 
The Israeli problems in southern Lebanon were the result of two fac-
tors: (1) the steady development of an atmosphere of hatred in which no 
significant elements of the Shi'ite population acknowledged Israel in a 
favorable light; and (2) the occurrence of incidents which ignited hatred 
and pushed the conflict to new levels of confrontation. 
Both of the above problems are serious and difficult to control. The 
first is, however, the result of deliberate policy while the second tends to 
be the result of mistakes that occur within the framework of the policy. 
The first type of problem is therefore more subject to systemic controls. 
The second problem, if not controlled within the framework of policy, 
will require continued good judgment which cannot be present among all 
ranks at all times. The roots of Israel's failure in Lebanon must, 
therefore, be understood by considering overall policy and not just the 
specific unforeseen and unplanned incidents at Sukmour and Nabatiye. 
Israel's deliberate policies in Lebanon were clearly linked to Jewish 
public opinion in Israel and must be understood in that context. The 
policies of the Israeli occupation like those of any democratic state were 
subject to public scrutiny and thus politicized to a considerable degree. 
This had the effect not only of forcing the Likud government (which was 
responsible for the initial invasion of Lebanon) to minimize casualties 
but also of forcing it to show tangible Israeli gains resulting from the 
decisions to invade Lebanon in 1982 and to stay on in that country after 
the PLO had been expelled from Beirut in September. 
Two ways in which the Likud could demonstrate the benefits of its 
policies in Lebanon were through economic gains in the south and 
through the establishment of a strong Christian militia that could exer-
cise considerable authority in that same area. Such a militia might even-
tually link itself with an anti-Palestinian Maronite government in Beirut 
and thus help to tilt the entire Lebanese political structure toward 
cooperation with the Israelis. This would be in addition to the security 
benefits such an organization would provide if it was disciplined and pro-
fessional. The Israelis therefore linked themselves to a marginal (and 
potentially dependent) minority group within south Lebanon in order to 
address the issue of Palestinian terrorism. A side-effect of this policy was 
to inject Israel into internal Lebanese power politics and alienate a vast 
majority of the mainstream population of the south by doing so. 
However natural it is for elected leaders to respond to their consti-
tuencies, the sum total of these policies was to make enemies of the 
mainstream population of southern Lebanon and to be driven out of 
southern Lebanon by these new enemies. Israel lost credibility with the 
Shi'ites because it defined its own security interests as being dependent 
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on a small minority group and as totally contrary to the Shi'ite desire to 
have an important voice in Lebanon's political future. Furthermore, it 
displayed unwarranted confidence by assuming that such changes would 
be passively accepted merely because the country was occupied. Had the 
Israeli leadership more carefully considered Shi'ite objections to their 
economic policies and to the nurturing and expansion of the SLA they 
might have been able to contain the Shi'ite resistance at a more 
manageable level. The Israelis might also have been able to gain open or 
tacit supporters within the Shi'ite community. These supporters could 
have been supplied with covert aid and other encouragement. 
Another important possibility within the above context is that in a 
less confrontational environment Israeli security needs might not be as 
stringent as those which eventually became necessary. Furthermore, the 
Israelis might have at least partially compensated for those problems by 
an aggressive program of supporting the Shi'ite economy through the 
restriction of Israeli imports to the south and by backing the attempts of 
Shi'ites to remain competitive in the Beirut market. This would certainly 
involve, where possible, lifting the bans on products moving northward 
to markets in Beirut. It might also have involved the limited use of some 
Israeli military resources such as storehouses to support Shi'ite economic 
enterprises. 
In summary, the Israeli military policies in southern Lebanon were 
eventually perceived by the Shi'ites as requiring total subservience to 
Israel and its Christian allies for an indefinite but possibly very long 
period of time. The Shi'ites believed that the economy was to be 
reordered as an Israeli appendage and that their non-Moslem coun-
trymen were to be given responsibility for their internal security. With 
this vision of the future they felt that they had no alternative but to resist. 
The lessons for the West from this situation are apparent. Structural 
changes imposed on a political-economic system cannot endure (without 
perpetual occupation) if such changes disproportionately consider the 
needs of the occupying power at the expense of the population. Such 
changes will, instead, tend to produce a backlash and encourage the 
development of resistance movements when the capacity to resist is in-
tact. Such resistance movements, unless controlled by military means, 
might ultimately define the future of the territory in question. It, 
therefore, becomes imperative for occupation policies to be based on 
considerations other than domestic public opinion. 
Ironically, the Israelis could have achieved their paramount goal of 
expelling the PLO from southern Lebanon by simply giving the Shi'ites 
some latitude to resolve their own futures. The mid-1985 "War of the 
Camps" near Beirut between the PLO and the Amal and its allies il-
lustrated that at least one politically important Shi'ite group was com-
pletely unwilling to allow the PLO to return to southern bases. These 
anti-PLO sentiments were not disguised prior to the 1982 invasion and 
should not have been dismissed in its aftermath (when Shi'ite groups 
friendly to the PLO were much weaker). The problem for Israel was that 
domestic public opinion needed to see the development of clear gains 
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in southern Lebanon. Tacit allies were an unacceptable exchange for 
losses and Israel correspondingly demanded more open collaboration. 
Unable to work within these constraints the Shi'ites saw their only re-
maining option as armed resistance. 
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